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The fundamental right to defense is offered in Jalisco through the 
Social Attorney’s Office. This institution is in charge of, on one 
hand, offering legal representation in matters concerning the family 
and civil orders (social representation), as well as offering proper 
technical defense to every citizen who, not being able to pay for 
a lawyer they trust, has been charged with a common-law crime 
(public defender’s office). As such, this institution is the access chan-
nel to justice for the poorest sectors of the population. In a state such 
as Jalisco, and according to the report “Pobreza 2014 en Jalisco” 
(Poverty in Jalisco) by Coneval, only 27.1% of the population clas-
sified as “Not poor and not vulnerable” would be in a position to 
choose and pay for their own lawyer, while the remaining 73% 
very likely will have to wait for the State to assign them a defender 
because they have some kind of vulnerability (moderate, extreme 
poverty or social or income deficiencies). In fact, of the cases filed 
at the defender’s office, only about 10% have a private lawyer, while 
the remaining 90% requests the support of a court-appointed public 
defender (Interview 5, 2015).
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In addition to providing access to justice for the most vulnerable 
sector, since 2008 the constitutional reform in penal matters intro-
duced at the federal level intends for the defender’s offices to imple-
ment adversarial system mechanisms to protect the defendants’ right 
more effectively. Proper free-of-charge defense is a right guaranteed 
by human right international treaties of which Mexico is a party, such 
as the American Human Rights Convention and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Moreover, since 2011 the pu-
blic defender’s office in Mexico, as the state apparatus authority, is 
in charge of promoting, protecting and ensuring human rights veri-
fying that the broadest and most favorable laws are applied for the 
people, in compliance with what is established in the constitution 
and in the international treaties ratified by Mexico. 
These are important challenges for any institution, in particular, 
if it lacks the human and material resources and its personnel is not 
professionally well trained to tackle such demand. So what challen-
ges are currently faced by the public defender’s office in Jalisco to 
provide proper defense? Despite the relevance this institution has, 
there are few studies on it and they are most centered on describing 
the juridical framework. In this chapter, I show the situation in which 
social representation operates in Jalisco1 in two aspects: labor con-
ditions and professionalization of public defenders. I focus the study 
on the area called public defender’s office, with the objective of as-
sessing its role by providing a proper, technical defense for the most 
vulnerable population charged with a crime, in addition to show the 
challenges resulting from the current shortages in the defender’s 
office as appointed by the courts to ensure the rule of law in the 
entity. This paper is based on documentary review of legal texts and 
academic papers, as well as on 14 interviews with public defenders 
from the Jalisco penal sector.2
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I organize the present chapter in three sections. First, I discuss 
briefly the concept of the Rule of Law, above all to place in its center 
the role of the court-appointed public defender’s office in this con-
text. In the second section I analyze the case of the public defender’s 
office in Jalisco considering two aspects: a) internal management 
and the conditions for everyday work; and b) the defenders’ training 
and professional profile. Finally and taking into consideration what 
is set out in section three, I conclude with a proposition for the re-
form of the court-appointed defender’s office.
There are many political scholars who argue that a necessary con-
dition for the existence of a democratic regime is the establishment 
of a reasonably healthy rule of law (D’Alessio, 1993; Huntington, 
1991; Brinks 2008). The history of the rule of law, as a concept and 
juridical arrangement, dates back to the days in which the European 
nation-states were created. There have been four particularly impor-
tant experiences that help us understand the contemporary rule of 
law: 1) the German Rechtsstaat, 2) the English Rule of Law, 3) the 
American Rule of Law and 4) the French État de Droit (Zolo and 
Costa: 2006). Each and every one of these experiences gave the con-
cept of rule of law attributes that have been preserved to date: limi-
ting political power and equality in the eyes of the law (English rule 
of law), separation of powers and constitutional revision of the laws 
(American rule of law), sovereignty of the law (French Etat de droit) 
and supremacy of the law (German Rechtsstaat). There are several 
definitions for the rule of law and its content depends on the school 
that it comes from (philosophic, jurisprudential or political).
The notion at the center of the classical definition of the rule of 
law is that no one must be above the law. In his Introduction to the 
Study of Law in the Constitution, Albert Venn Dicey provides a defi-
nition that captures the essence of the concept:
First, the rule of law means absolute supremacy and predominance of the re-
gular law, contrasting the influence of arbitrary power, and excluding the exis-
tence arbitrariness, of prerogatives as well as a broad discretional authority on 
the part of the government […] it means equality before the law, or the equal 
abidance of all the classes by the common law of the country as administered 
by the ordinary courts; no man can be punished or subjected to corporal or 
material punishment unless they have broken the law established by the legal 
codes (Dicey, 1915: 110, 120).
Therefore, legal equality of the subjects is the conditio sine qua non 
to have the rule of law. Survival of the rule of law is ensured if no 
citizen is more equal than others in the eyes of the law.
However, the rule of law is a multidimensional concept that de-
mands a definition from the legal, institutional, political and cultu-
ral points of view. Considering only one of these definitions mainly 
results in valuing the reality of the phenomenon partially. The rule 
of law needs clear public and general rules, as well as institutions, 
institutional designs and operators whose values and attitudes make 
said rule work coherently with a democratic system. As the chap-
ters in this book show (see: Avelar, Chaires and Haro), the effective 
function of the different institutions in the justice sector influences 
the type of rule of law and security we have. We cannot expect the 
rule of law to work if its institutional, legal and operative compo-
nents (the police, the court-appointed defenders, the attorney’ offi-
ce, the courts and the correctional centers) face severe problems of 
political independence, professionalization, transparency, available 
staff, infrastructure, material resources, labor security or social re-
cognition. In other words, to have effective rule of law it is crucial 
to consider not just the laws promulgated, but also the set of institu-
tions in the justice sector, their interaction, as well as the variables 
associated with the institutional design and the attitudes and values 
of the justice operators and their environment.
As it can be observed, building the rule of law is not a simple one-
dimensional undertaking. One way to contribute (there are others 
and this book includes them) to its smooth running is by ensuring 
access to justice, by means of free, proper technical defense. In coun-
tries like Mexico with great levels of inequality and poverty, this type 
of service by the State is an imperative. In times of democratization, 
any politician will agree that proper legal defense in court must not 
depend on the defendant’s wealth. That is why the political class in 
Mexico has signed and ratified several international treaties on the 
subject of human rights that bind the Mexican State to ensure pro-
per, free defense. In addition, it has sought to introduce substantial 
reforms to modify the institutional design and the rules of the game 
under which most institutions in the justice sector operate (see: Ze-
peda, in this book). Notwithstanding, these changes have hardly per-
meated the local scene. 
In this chapter, I analyze the rule of law through the local public 
defender’s office. The role of the defender’s office is crucial in the 
“chain” that presupposes the action of the institutions in the justice 
sector, given that it is the doorway to the judicial system and the 
protection of the people’s rights among the least privileged sectors. 
In that sense, Ferrajoli points out that “the lack of (proper) defense 
ends up by in fact rendering useless all the other guarantees of a fair 
process” (2011, p. 77), because unless a person is in a position to ac-
cess justice, then all the other rights and judicial guarantees such as 
presumption of innocence and due process fade away. 
The defender’s office in Jalisco is regulated by the State Constitution 
and the Ley Orgánica de la Procuraduría Social (The Organic Law 
of the Social Attorney, LOPS). In Article 7, paragraph A of the cons-
titution, it is established that: “the State will ensure the existence of a 
quality public defender service for the people […]” (CPEJ, 1917). By 
means of this affirmative action3—that is, providing proper technical 
defense—, the state of Jalisco seeks to comply with the constitution 
and the international treaties on human rights ratified by Mexico to 
provide effective access to justice. 
According to what is stipulated in Article 54 of the state consti-
tution and the 2nd of the LOPS, the defender’s office is an institution 
that depends on the executive, that is, the governor has the faculties 
3. Mauro Capelleti and Bryant Garth point out that in view of the potential inequalities that 
there may be among litigants and, above all, in view of the recognition of human rights 
and the government’s social obligations it has become common place to observe that 
(commitment and) affirmative action on the part of the State is necessary to ensure the 
enjoyment of these rights by all” (1996, p. 12).
to appoint and dismiss freely the holder of the office. The political 
dependence of the justice institutions has been severely questioned 
by the literature in judicial studies (Bill-Chavez, 2003; Finkel, 2008; 
Basabe, 2012) under the logic that an institution dominated by the 
political power tends to generate institutional instability (changes, 
transfers, re-learning) and to protect the rights of the State and not 
those of the citizens. A public defender’s office dependent on the 
executive is more vulnerable still in a context in which the state ge-
neral attorney’s office is dependent too. In a scenario like this, the 
Executive holder could urge their subordinate, the holder of the pu-
blic defender’s office, to protect their interests and not those of the 
defendant accused of a crime, for example, connected with organi-
zed crime, when convenient for the Executive. We would be facing 
a scenario where the judicial guarantees such as due process, pre-
sumption of innocence and access to justice stipulated in internatio-
nal treaties could be damaged.
The defender’s office (penal area) in Jalisco has 38 public defen-
ders assigned to the department, 16 of them render their services in 
civil courts of the Puente Grande Correctional Facility, and 22 in the 
areas of pretrial investigation of the state general attorney’s office. 
For the zona metropolitana de Guadalajara (the Guadalajara Me-
tropolitan Area), with a population of 4’434.878 inhabitants, there 
are 0.9 defender per 100,000 inhabitants. The figure is alarming, sin-
ce it jeopardizes any effort to strengthen the rule of law or to moder-
nize the institution if the number of defenders assigned to the public 
defender’s office is not increased first. There is not even one defen-
der per 100,000 people. In states of other Latin-American countries, 
such as for example, Rio de Janeiro, the number of public defenders 
per 100,000 inhabitants is 4.8 (Ministerio da Justiça, 2015). In fact, as 
it will be shown below, the small number of defenders is one of the 
problems that are most often cited by public defenders as one of the 
most palpable deficiencies in the institution.
In the defender’s office, the way in which the cases are assigned 
or distributed to a defender is through the system of shifts, that is, 
the case’s complexity is not considered, just the defender’s luck. On 
a lucky day they could be assigned 10 petty larceny cases, one homi-
cide and one kidnapping case; but they could also be unlucky enough 
to get in their shift five homicide cases, four rape cases, two organi-
zed crime cases and two kidnapping cases. There is no specialization 
in types of crime, that is, defenders specializing in just kidnapping 
cases, or crimes against health, rape, homicide, organized crime. 
According to the Manual de Defensoría Penal Pública para América 
Latina y el Caribe (Manual for the Criminal Defender’s office for Latin 
America and the Caribbean), specialization would allow “optimizing 
the defenders’ useful time” (CEJA-PNUD, 2005, p. 69) and pay more 
effective attention to more complex crimes such as the ones mentio-
ned above. In the courts of the Puente Grande Correctional Facility 
each defender is assigned, between two and three times a month, 
to the courtroom of the moment and therefore they receive all the 
accusations made by the district attorney. In Puente Grande, there 
are 16 courtrooms and there are 16 defenders assigned to them, but 
when one of them is having health issues, then one of the remaining 
defenders is assigned to cover for them, thus increasing the number 
of cases they handle:
When a colleague gets sick we have to cover two courtrooms per day. When 
they take vacations, we have to cover two courtrooms a day and that happens 
in the two vacation periods, we work double shifts, sometimes up to 24 hours 
(Interview 9, 2015). 
According to the defenders interviewed, the average number of cases 
a defender receives on their shift is 18.
In this respect, public defenders argue that their workload is very 
high. They are right. Each public defender assigned to the Puente 
Grande courts work 350 cases a year as an average. To put this figure 
in perspective, a public defender in the federal area takes between 
30 and 40 cases a year: 
We local public defenders “take almost 300% more (cases) than federal public 
defenders” (Interview 7, 2015). However, in addition to studying the cases they 
have been assigned, they are burdened with the “inactive cases, that is, any 
person who had a process 5, 10, 15, or 20 years ago may come and cancel the 
file and those are not active […] we request to have them brought up from the 
archives, we petition to have the punishment extinction or any other thing that 
is required” (Interview 6, 2015). In addition, the defenders’ activities extend 
to clerical, administrative and management work “we are jacks-of-al-trades” 
(Interview 7, 2015).
We also carry out formalities assigned from a foreign judge or a judge from 
another state via letters rogatory, by inmates who are serving time here but 
committed a crime in another state, still they are imprisoned here for reasons 
of the correctional’s security, then, the judge is asked to file someone’s testi-
mony, an experts’ testimony, an inspection, etc. we even have to go to the pri-
sons that are here in the penitentiary, which are around five (Interview 3, 2015).
I can tell you that we have to take home some cases to make conclusions, to 
study them, because here we don’t have time to study a file, why? Because we 
have to see the users, file reports, file formalities, then, when we have filed the 
formalities we have to take that file, check it and start carrying out all the steps: 
the questioning, the confrontation of witnesses. We have to take the file home 
to study it and then the following day start with the defense: to interrogate the 
defendant or provide more evidence (Interview 5, 2015).
[…] we take home our administrative stuff; we have to write reports, because 
we only have two clerks for 16 defenders. This is terrible! Two clerks for 16 de-
fenders. The two clerks are not enough and we help them any way we can, we 
support them so that they learn to write the reports. I mean, they do help us a 
lot and if it weren’t for them we would go crazy (Interview 11, 2015).
There is a general agreement among the defenders that human 
resources should be at least doubled, that is, two defense attorneys 
per courtroom or, at least one clerk per defender so that they con-
tribute to give information, type or write the reports. They tell us 
that they are overwhelmed with work and compared themselves with 
other institutions such as the federal public defender’s office.
Taking into consideration the fact that there are three defenders per courtroom 
in the federal sector and that there are fewer cases than what we have, I believe 
that we need more staff here in the civil courts (Interview 8, 2015). 
The structural and material conditions for work are not better either. 
The public defender’s office does not have support areas for expert 
services and when they are necessary, the defendant and the defen-
der have to seek the resources to perform them: 
[…] The defender’s office does not have an experts’ area where we can, for 
example, request an expert’s report on a traffic accident, because the institute 
issuing a report often tends to favor the prosecutor’s decision. We can’t provide 
evidence such as an expert’s report, we simply don’t have one. We have to look 
for someone who would make the report for us because the defender’s office 
does not have one assigned to it (Interview 5, 2015). 
In addition, most of the defenders interviewed coincide in that they 
do not have enough material resources such as fully functional com-
puters, pens, paper, toner, printers and even toilet paper and clea-
ning service: “we sometimes have to look for help to clean our offices 
(Interviews 6-9, 11-13 2015). They do not have the compensatory 
support for the cases in which they are asked to carry out formali-
ties in other courthouses or when the defendant is hospitalized and 
they have to travel to the hospital (Interview 12, 2015). On the other 
hand, the expenses of other services requested by the users such as 
photocopies, buses, food are sometimes paid by the defender, given 
the degree of poverty which afflicts the defendants charged with a 
crime or their family, that is, several defenders argued that they were 
morally obliged to support them due to these people’s vulnerability. 
Unfortunately, the public defender’s office does not have a budget 
allotted to them to compensate its defenders for these situations. 
That is why we have a defender’s office lacking the sufficient number 
of defenders working in precarious material conditions to provide a 
proper technical defense: an affirmative action by the State without 
content.
Regarding the public defenders’ professional profile, we can say 
that all those interviewed claimed to have attained the Bachelor of 
Law degree. Moreover, they all said that they had taken different 
courses on several areas such as human rights or the new adversarial 
criminal justice system. Only one of them claimed to have a masters’ 
degree.
In other states of the republic like Baja California Sur or Nuevo 
León, the organic law of the public defender’s office and its regu-
lations are two of the legal codes establishing the bases for the ca-
reer professional service. In the case of Jalisco, the LOPS does not 
contain any section dedicated to the defenders’ career professional 
service, that is, it does not specify whether the public defenders are 
selected by means of competitive examinations following open, pu-
blic calls; the existence of a model of governance and rendering of 
accounts (Piana, 2010), like a councils in charge of managing the 
defenders’ academic and training courses, promotions, evaluations, 
changes or transfers. It should be noted that the Political Constitu-
tion of the State of Jalisco stipulates in a general manner the career 
professional service in Article 7, section A: “The State […] shall en-
sure the conditions for the defenders’ career professional service” 
(CPEJ, 1917). However, this does not occur in practice and it has not 
been incorporated to the LOPS y and bylaws have not been set up to 
specify in more detail how it would operate. The only characteristic 
of a career professional service that is stipulated in the LOPSE is 
the reason why public defenders shall be dismissed: for breaking the 
defender’s office’s rules.
In this scenario, it is small wonder that a truly career professional 
service does not exist in practice. And the people interviewed confir-
med this view. The way in which they were hired is heterogeneous. 
Several of them claim that they were hired after a public, open 
competitive examination process, because prior to 2007 the public 
defender’s office depended on the judiciary and the Supreme Court 
of Justice of the State of Jalisco (STJEJ) was in charge of managing 
the new arrivals:
They used to be published in advance (the open calls) just as the federal (defen-
ders), but that has disappeared. There used to be calls every so often (Interview 
6, 2015). 
Despite this, some of the defenders that were hired by the defender’s 
office at that time claimed that they were hired basically because 
someone (the president of the Supreme Court of Justice or the main 
official) invited them. Since 2007, hiring the defenders includes 
knowing somebody, “a friend in court”, but in some cases they also 
have to take exams, (psychological, psychometric or law tests), com-
plete their social service or accrue merits at the defender’s office, 
or else present the documents and résumé and expect to be hired 
without any calls (Interviews 4, 5, 7, 10, 12). In fact, most defenders 
failed to accurately explain what the selection process is like to be 
hired as public defender right now, in addition, their answers are also 
heterogeneous; that is, while some assure that the selection process 
is carried out by means of a call, others claim the opposite. I repro-
duce below some of the most representative answers:
I don’t really know, I just submitted my documents and then I was called. But I 
don’t know what they base their decision on (Interview 12, 2015).
Well, I understand that at present, because I got in quite a while ago, they have 
to take some exams on the new system update and I understand that they must 
know some English and be updated in general (Interview 3, 2015).
Depending on who “their friend in court” is. Then it would be easy (Interview 
7, 2015).
There aren’t any more calls for the civil courts, for the federal ones, I know the-
re are. But not here, I don’t know how a person gets hired (Interview 11, 2015).
I still think that it is by means of some sort of call and the candidate must have 
the requirements necessary (Interview 14, 2015).
As we can see, the selection process for the defender’s office varies 
and it does not stick to the foundations of a career professional ser-
vice. However, all the defenders know clearly who is in charge of 
dismissing them and why. In fact, it is clear, too, in the LOPS, in the 
second chapter called “About the Responsibilities, Infractions and 
Penalties”. All the defenders assure that they can be fired by their 
immediate superior, the head of the institution or the governor. As 
we all know, this does not stick to any model of professionalization, 
where it would be desirable for the dismissal to be made by a coun-
cil or collegial body. In addition, the defenders know perfectly well 
that the reasons for the dismissal have to do with how they treat the 
user, if they ask them for money, “because they do not handle the 
files well” (Interviews 3-14, 2015). The defenders that have witnes-
sed the dismissal of a defender confirm that it has been because of 
the reasons just mentioned (Interview 13, 2015). In turn, transfers or 
changes from one area, office or region to another respond essentia-
lly to the needs of the service, but also “the person’s own interest” 
or “truth for punishment; see if I don’t get punished. The criminal 
justice area is considered as a punishment area. But no, it is a pretty 
area, I adore it. I prefer it to any other area” (Interviews 6 and 7, 
2015). At any rate, the defenders’ professional profile does not seem 
to be taken into consideration in transfer management.
Another indicator of a career professional system is constant tra-
ining through courses for the defenders, from which the evaluations, 
promotions and punishments derive. In general, in other institutions 
—such as the federal judiciary— this is managed by a council and it 
allows the defenders to have incentives to change rank or category. In 
the case of the public defender’s office in Jalisco there is no promo-
tion ladder system in place (defender A, B, C, for example) to make 
sense of the evaluations, promotions or punishment. In fact, there 
no training courses organized or managed by the social attorney’s 
office. Most of the defenders interviewed claim that they have re-
ceived training courses in the past year, above all in the area of the 
new adversarial system (oral proceedings, alternative justice and hu-
man rights), given the imminent coming into force of the criminal 
justice reform. However, said courses are organized by the STJEJ, 
the Universidad de Guadalajara, the Attorney General’s Office or 
the Secretaría Técnica del Consejo de Coordinación para la Imple-
mentación del Sistema de Justicia Penal (The Coordination Council 
Technical Secretariat for the Implementation of the Criminal Justice 
System, SETEC). The main implication this has is that sometimes it is 
complicated to attend the courses taught at other venues:
[The courses] don’t come here and one of the things that make us more unha-
ppy is that they take place during our working hours. We are told that some of 
them are compulsory but they don’t take into account that our work load here 
is quite different. Sometimes we want to leave at three, but at that time, we are 
given a new case and we have to stay and then as a result, we don’t take the full 
course. And it is not repeated so that we can attend. [at the defender’s office] 
we are told “there are courses that will last for this many days” and only those 
on duty are allowed to skip class, but they never take into account those of us 
who were assigned a case. It’s not that we don’t want to go; it’s just that we can’t 
because we have work to do (Interview 13, 2015).
Thus, it is evident that one of the most important elements to set in 
motion a career system at the defender’s office is lacking: a council 
in charge of evaluating, rewarding and punishing the defenders not 
only on the basis of their constant training but also their everyday 
performance. 
Finally, it is convenient to discuss the defenders’ salaries. Despi-
te what is established in Article 7 of the State constitution that reads 
“the defenders’ remunerations cannot be less than what corresponds 
to the Attorney General’s agents” (CPEJ, 1917) this is not so for mi-
nistry agents get at least twice as much as the public defenders. 
[…] in keeping with the principle of equality of the parties (the general 
attorney’s and the defender’s office) I believe that we should all be homologi-
zed. Recently, the reforms to the constitution intend to homologize both the 
general attorney’s office and us, but in the meantime, in the traditional system 
we have at present there is indeed a gap in salaries (Interview 8, 2015).
But the situation with the salary is still more complicated because, 
even though there are no different ranks or categories among the 
defenders, their salaries are different: while some defenders pointed 
out that they make 12 to 13 thousand pesos a month, others get 18 to 
23 thousand pesos a month. Their work is the same, and so is their 
workload; but some were lucky enough to be hired when the public 
defender’s office was part of the Judiciary, while others were emplo-
yed once the institution had been transferred to the Executive.
We, the current public defender, or the wrongly called social agent, with the 
new Organic Law of the Social attorney’s office, earn much less than the public 
defender that used to belong to the Supreme Court and, well, in comparison 
with the federal public defender we are in a shameful situation. While the cu-
rrent social agent earns 13 thousand pesos, I understand that the federal public 
defender earns up to 40 thousand or more. Which is totally illogical and inhu-
mane considering how much more work we do […] in the case of the public 
defender in the civil courts, we ought to earn the same as a general attorney’s 
office’s agent from the civil courts (Interview 9, 2015).
There are two types of defenders here. We are the same, but there are some of 
us who were originally from the Supreme Court, and our salary is a little higher 
than that of the defenders hired by the Social Office; even that is very wrong 
because our workload is the same (Interview 11, 2015)
Equality of the parties is essential for there to be a proper defense. 
However, the state government has not done enough to change that, 
not even within the defender’s office itself, where the salaries earned 
by the defenders are different even though they do the same work. 
The following section provides a proposal to improve the conditions 
in which the public defender’s office operates at present in the state 
of Jalisco.
It is hard to assert that just the way things are at the public defender’s 
office in Jalisco, it would be possible to make progress in terms of 
the rule of law. As indicated at the beginning of this chapter, the 
rule of law demands the good working order of the different jus-
tice sector institutions. What kind of defender’s office is necessary to 
favor the construction of the rule of law in the state? On the basis of 
what is explained in the previous section, the pressing challenge of 
a substantial reform in the public defender’s office is identified. In 
the remainder of the chapter, I present the most pressing matters to 
make the inner workings of this institution compatible with the rule 
of law and democracy in Jalisco:
Political independence of the public defender’s office is essential to 
protect it from improper influences and thus ensure equality of the 
parties, since the main role of the public defender’s office is to pro-
tect the defendants’ rights. An independent public defender’s office 
entails changing the selection process, term in office and dismissal of 
the high officials in the institution, which has occurred so far, predo-
minantly following political loyalties or by means of the sponsorship 
system. The selection of the highest officials must be carried out by 
a council (see below) made up of representatives of at least three 
different sectors: the Legislative, the defender’s office and members 
of the organized civil society, by means of a public call procedure and 
competitive exams. In addition, it is important for the office holder’s 
term in office to stop being flexible and for fixed eight-year terms to 
be established, without the possibility to renew their offices. In turn, 
the potential dismissal of an office holder must be managed by the 
council and will only be justified by the serious causes established by 
the law in regards of public servants. A design of this kind, protects 
the institution on different fronts: the most competitive professional 
is selected, privilege is bestowed on merit, not loyalty, in addition, it 
ensures labor stability for the high-ranking officials when they make 
a decision that is contrary to the political group that is in power or 
when the government changes. Reforming the institution in this 
direction will place us at the level of other states in Latin-American 
countries such as Argentina and Brazil. 
Budget autonomy of the defender’s office implies that the institution 
can design, request, administer and lobby its own budget in congress. 
This will allow setting in motion the institution’s most pressing pro-
jects such as the career service in the defender’s office, a training 
facility, hiring more personnel, equalizing the salaries among equal-
rank defenders, as well as payment for expert services. If we intend 
to improve access to justice, it is necessary for the defender’s office 
to have the proper budgetary resources to perform their function.
Professionalization of public defenders is one of the most important 
elements for this institution to contribute to strengthen the rule of 
law in Jalisco. Setting up a career system is a constitutional impera-
tive in the state and its design and implementation must be compa-
tible with standards that would ensure an effective access to justice 
through technical defense. The first step for this to happen is having 
a model of governance and rendering of accounts: a defender’s 
office council in charge of managing the process for the selection, 
training, evaluation, promotion, punishment, transfer and dismissal 
of public defenders. Given that the functions this council is in charge 
of are crucial for the good working order of the defender’s office, 
it is essential for this collegial body to be designed well, that is, its 
composition must not answer to political interests, so that the insti-
tution secures the best professionals. Thus one way to get members 
for this council would be from at least three entities: a representative 
of the defenders, one from the Legislative and one from organized 
civil society collectives. This will ensure that the selection of new 
defenders at open public calls be more impartial and based on the 
candidate’s capacity and not the friends they have. Moreover, among 
the operative functions of this council is installing and developing a 
training facility with the objective of creating links with other bodies 
(universities, international institutions or foundations) to train its 
members. This will make more sense if the institution’s operation 
structure is redesigned and a promotion ladder system is set up to 
allow professionalization to become important to the defender, that 
is, that it becomes installed in the defender’s perception as one more 
incentive to develop and grow, so that they see the institution as a 
desirable place to consolidate a professional career due to the social 
recognition it entails, and not as a halfway place to build a résumé 
because the work is exhausting in addition to poorly paid and lacking 
mechanisms for professional growth.
Any attempts at reform that ignores increasing the number of defen-
ders assigned to the public defender’s office will be the basis for 
future chronicles of their failure. Not even the most professional 
or independent public defender will be able to manage the current 
demand this institution has. If equality is to be sought between the 
parties in terms of access to justice, then, there is no basis for the 
general attorney’s office or the courts to have three times more 
support than what is available for the defenders at present, since 
this violates constitutional and conventional principles. A defender 
should be able to manage around 40 cases a year to be in a position 
to provide proper technical defense. This means, in the context of 
the current conditions, tripling the personnel assigned to this area 
to avoid undermining the other reforms. However, it should also be 
pointed out that increasing the number of defenders in itself will not 
manage to improve the operation capacity of the defender’s offices. 
It is necessary for this measure to be accompanied by the setting up 
of a new model of case management, such as integral attention cen-
ters (Zepeda, 2014, p.12) to prioritize, for example, the use of alter-
native mechanisms for the resolution of conflicts that would avoid 
bringing to court cases such as those of petty larceny.
In conclusion, reforms and transformations of this magnitude 
imply that the representatives place access to justice and the rule of 
law as a priority and think that in the immediate future, given the 
competitiveness attained by the party system in Jalisco, they will not 
be in power; therefore, having an independent, professional justice 
system that is not vulnerable to political power is also in the best of 
their interest.
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